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Since December 2024, we have been testing GNSS anomalies together with Gdańsk Airport (EPGD). Gdańsk was chosen on purpose because it is the closest commercial airport to the Kaliningrad region. Our research shows that both the airport and the large surrounding airspace are under constant attack.
Basic jamming techniques that interfere with all signals have now evolved into more targeted, directional, and sophisticated attacks. It looks like the Baltic region and Warsaw FIR have become a "civilian" battlefield for testing. In other words, everything is being done - except ... shooting.
Regardless of the legality of these actions, it is important to remember that, according to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), satellite navigation signals should not be disturbed. However, these attacks are becoming more aggressive and relentless. Russia is acting with complete impunity, provoking and waiting for results.
So far, nothing serious has happened. To raise awareness, we decided to share some of our observations.
Measurement Techniques
Without going too deep into details, here are the main assumptions for our tests:
To observe and interpret anomalies effectively, both ground-based and airborne sensors are required.
ADS-B data, visualised at https://spoofing.skai-data-services.com/, are very useful however needs to be supplemented with aircraft-based sensors.
Due to the way radio waves propagation, the ground network should have as many sensors as possible.
ADS-B data are reliable but provides a statistical view of interference areas. They are not providing exact data in real-time (or close to real-time) and exact nature of anomalies.
A detailed analysis of anomalies requires specialized monitoring equipment, both in the air and on the ground.
Terrain plays a key role in signal jamming/spoofing. Natural (forests) and artificial (buildings) obstacles limit interference effectiveness. However, with enough sensors and multilateration algorithms, we can accurately determine the location and movement of interference sources.
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Now, Let’s Get to the Point
Our tests have revealed that Russian attacks are not random or reckless. The common belief that Russia is technologically backward is simply wrong. We often underestimate the skill and precision of the opponent.
The Russians are not just clever in their actions; they are also cunning and ruthless. Some may say this is nothing new, but we believe it is worth emphasising.
Russia has forcefully intruded into our airspace, infiltrated the European continent under the guise of civilian activity, and is spreading confusion.
We get used to their operations in cyberspace, but direct interference with our civilian infrastructure marks a new phase of hybrid warfare.
If we had to summarise our findings in one sentence, it would be this:
The aggressor is (always) watching, and Russia employs every possible method - both official and not - including access to commonly used devices and networks.
Since anomaly monitoring is an ongoing process, and we are fully aware that this article will be read by Russian entities, we have chosen to share only a few key conclusions.
Conclusions
The Russians use directional antennas to jamm/spoof specific aircraft.
Their jamming techniques are not very advanced, but they are extremely powerful. At first, this may seem to contradict what we said earlier. However, our observations suggest that instead of improving their spoofing methods, the Russians prefer to use them more strategically. It’s like watching a bank account owner, waiting for them to leave their browser open, rather than trying to break encryption with advanced hacking techniques.
Spoofing - making an aircraft appear somewhere else - usually starts with aggressive jamming, followed by injecting fake satellite signals.
The Russians attack all satellite constellations, including their own Glonass.
They have access to the civilian AFTN network and know which flights are happening and when.
Due to the high power and directional antennas, their range of interferences can extend hundreds of kilometres.
Most jamming attacks on aircraft do not reach the ground.
Local ground attacks using relatively cheap jammers do not significantly affect aircraft in the air.
The attacks are not only originated from Russian territory.
The largest number of small-scale, low-power jamming events come from "electronic troublemakers," hackers, taxi drivers, car thieves, and government agencies.
Summary
Be prepared - what started in the Middle East and is now happening in Eastern Europe will eventually spread worldwide, including European areas far from the eastern borders.
In this article, we deliberately left out technical details, consequences, and potential impacts. If you are interested in this topic, feel free to contact us.
We have become dependent on satellite technology, and a coordinated attack on multiple systems at once could - and likely will - have catastrophic consequences.
The enemy is always watching and will eventually find a weak point in the system - understood as a "system of systems" - a method that could cost lives even in regions far from direct armed conflict.
We continue to monitor GNSS anomalies. Our findings confirm that only by combining data from ground-based monitoring, airborne systems, and transponders can effectively identify, classify jamming and spoofing techniques, as well as their sources.
Should we monitor GNSS anomalies? If yes, why?
The awareness is needed for two things: first, for record-keeping, and second, to effectively prevent attacks. Preventing attacks is very expensive today, but it is possible. We offer you the first step.
If you suspect something unusual is happening with satellite navigation, please reach out. We have developed non-invasive techniques to detect and classify anomalies both in the air and on the ground.
We have the equipment, experience, and expertise to collect data that can serve as evidence in legal cases or investigations. We collaborate with platforms and other organizations to get the most comprehensive picture possible.
And finally, almost every week, we encounter something new.
It’s worth knowing what’s happening around you.
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